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Case No. 20140753-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/Petitioner, 
V. 
ADAM HOWARD JONES, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the respondent's brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Jones frames this case as "an alleged mishandling of a 
family incident." Br.Resp. 3. Starting from the premise that Jones acted as a 
brother, not a police officer, he- like the magistrate and court of appeals 
below - concludes that there was no probable cause for the charged 
offenses. 
That is certainly one way to view the evidence. But at the bindover 
stage, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in a light 
1nost favorable to the prosecution. Because the magish·ate and the court of 




There was probable cause for official misconduct.1 
Jones' s basic premise- adopted by both the magistrate and the court 
of appeals below-is that he was acting as a brother when he responded to 
his drunken brother's house while in his police cruiser, on duty, and in 
uniform. The State has addressed this argument in its opening brief. It 
responds here to specific points that Jones raises in his response. 
Jones argues that "the evidence was abundantly clear that he was not 
formally dispatched to a domestic violence situation," because the "only 
reason he went to the home is that he thought Martinez wanted to talk 
about his nephew." Br.Resp. 4, 22, 25-26. But the statute does not require a 
£annal dispatch call; it requires merely that the officer "respond[] to a 
domestic violence call." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2. Even the majority 
below recognized that "the Act is not limited to situations where a call to 
authorities specifically alleges domestic violence." State v. Jones, 2014 UT 
App 142, ,r21 n.6, 330 P.3d 97. And as Judge Christiansen explained in 
1 This section responds to Jones' s point I. B. 
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dissent, even if the initial call was not sufficient to put Jones on notice that 
he was responding to a domestic violence situation, that became abundantly 
clear on his arrival, when he was greeted by his drunken brother alleging 
that his girlfriend had assaulted him and a conflicting claim from the 
girlfriend. See id. at if 41 (Christiansen, J., dissenting); R29:4-6, State's Exh. 1 
at 5-7. While there clearly was a "call" here, one can also respond to a II call" 
alleging domestic violence that comes in person, rather than over the phone 
or radio. See, e.g., Call (n), including "an act or instance of telephoning," "a 
cry or shout," 11 a summons, invitation, or bidding." Available at 
http:// dictionary.reference .com/browse/ call?s=t, last accessed May 1, 
2015. 
Further, there was sufficient record evidence to conclude that Jones 
was responding to a domestic violence call where Jones told the jail deputy 
that he _responded to his brother's girlfriend's call to II take care of" his 
brother; he knew his brother had a drinking problem and became violent 
when drunk; he knew his brother lived with the girlfriend and had a history 
of drunkenness and domestic violence with that girlfriend; the girlfriend 
would call hin1 to calm his brother down when he was drunk; and Jones 
responded immediately. R29:3-8, 25, 56-57, 63-64; State's Exh. 1 at 3-17. 
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The legislature could not have intended to condition an officer's 
duties in such cases to turn on whether the officer was initially dispatched 
on a domestic violence call. To hold otherwise would work absurd results. 
See, e.g., Carter v. Lehi CihJ, 2012 UT 2, if 88, 269 P.3d 141 (refusing to impose 
requirements on initiative measures where requirements would create 
absurd results). 
Domestic violence poses great risks to both officers and victims. See 
State v. Vallasensor-Mesa, 2005 UT App 65, ,Il6, 108 P.3d 123 (recognizing 
that domestic violence cases present "'one of the most dangerous, volatile 
arrest situations confronting police") (citation and quotation omitted). If the 
Act's duties were triggered only if the initial call specified domestic 
violence, then the Act would be both under- and over-inclusive. It would 
be under-inclusive in cases that were initially- but erroneously- thought 
not to involve domestic violence; it would be over-inclusive for cases that 
were initially-but erroneously-thought to involve domestic violence. 
Indeed, the initial call and resulting dispatch may have no content at all, 
where, for example, a violent cohabitant disrupts a 911 call. See, e.g., State v. 
Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ~4, 144 P.3d 1152. Further, giving dispositive weight to 
the initial call or dispatch would also exclude situations in which an officer 
personally observed domestic violence. 
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Once those observations are made, the legislature could not have 
intended- as the court of appeals' opinion appears to presume - that an on-
duty police officer can refrain from performing his duties based on his own 
or the victim's preferences. Br.Pet. 36-37. The Act exists to cabin officer 
discretion, not con.£ er it. 
Jones accuses the State of being "intellectually dishonest" by 
overlooking evidence that he was acting as a brother. Br.Resp. 22-23. He 
also faults the State for viewing the evidence "in isolation." Id. But the 
State has merely argued the evidence-as it is entitled to do-in accordance 
with the bindover standard: viewing the evidence and drawing all 
reasonable inferences therefrmn in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, if 10, 20 P.3d 300. The existence of 
conflicting evidence is precisely why the ultimate determination of whether 
Jones was acting as a brother or a police officer should go to a jury. The low 
hurdle of the bindover standard exists only to "ferret[] out groundless and 
in1provident prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if20, 137 P.3d 787. 
As explained in the State's opening brief, it does not exist for the magistrate 
to determine the truth- thereby usurping the jury's role- by favoring 
defense-friendly arguments over prosecution-friendly ones. Br.Pet. 22-24. 
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Moreover, Jones commits the very error he accuses the State of 
committing- ignoring unfavorable evidence. He argues that Jones 
responded to the house in response to "a call on his personal cell phone 
frmn his [now] sister-in-law simply asking him to come over," and that she 
did not "tell him why she wanted him to come over." Br.Resp. 21-22. But 
this ignores the evidence that (1) Jones told the jail deputy the next day that 
the girlfriend called him and asked him to come "take care of" his brother; 
(2) Jones was thoroughly familiar with his brother's drinking and domestic 
violence history with his girlfriend; and (3) the girlfriend tended to call 
Jones when his brother was drunk to cahn his brother down. R29:3-8, 25, 
State's Exh. 1 at 3-17. Both the magistrate and the court of appeals were 
required to accept this evidence over Jones's later staten1ent that he was 
being asked to come over to talk about the girlfriend's son. Further, Jones's 
decision to immediately respond to her call just 1ninutes before the end of 
his shift belies his later claim that it was an informal family visit, and 
corroborates what he told the jailer. 
While Jones was there, he developed probable cause that domestic 
violence had taken place: the girlfriend called Jones to "take care of" his 
brother; the girlfriend had a history of calling Jones to help calm his brother 
down when he was drunk; Jones went over right away; Jones met his 
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drunken brother, which meant to Jones that he would be acting "stupid," 
"U:nreasona ble," and "extremely violent"; the girlfriend told Jones that his 
brother had kicked her; his brother had a history of domestic violence with 
his girlfriend; his brother admitted that he scratched himself in an effort to 
get his girlfriend arrested- and by inference, to falsely justify his kicking 
her. Br.Pet. 3-6, 31-34. 
Jones argues that a "mere allegation from an intoxicated party, 
without any redness or bruising as evidence, did not give Jones probable 
cause to believe that an act of domestic violence had taken place." Br.Resp. 
26. But a "jury can convict on the basis of the 'uncorroborated testimony of 
the victhn."' State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ,r14, 210 P.3d 288 ( citation 
omitted). If a jury can convict on it, a magistrate must bind over on it. And 
as shown, it was not the girlfriend's allegation alone which Jones had to 
consider - he knew his brother was drunk, was violent when he was drunk, 
had a history of domestic violence with this girlfriend, and that his brother 
had fabricated an attack against himself in order to h·y and get the girlfriend 
arrested. Br.Pet. 3-5. 
Further, the lack of redness or bruising is suspect where it comes from 
Jones' s own self-serving staten1ents, and where sheriff's deputies saw 
bruising forty-five minutes later. Compare R29:6, State~ s Exh. 1 at 8 with 
-7-
R29:46, 51. Even if the bruising took time to show up, the lack of it does not 
defeat probable cause under all the circumstances here. 
And even if Jones had not developed probable cause during his visit, 
he would still have been required to "prepare an incident report that 
include[d] [his] disposition of the case," because he was "responding to a 
complaint of domestic violence." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-2.2(6)(a). He did 
not do so. 
Jones also argues that the evidence does not support an intent to 
benefit himself or another because he repeatedly offered to call the sheriff's 
office and the girlfriend repeatedly refused. Br.Resp. 27. But this ignores 
the reason why the girlfriend refused: she and the brother could not 
"afford" to have the brother go to jail "again." State's Exh. 1 at 7-8. As 
explained in the State's opening brief, the evidence supported reasonable 
inferences that Jones acted as a police officer, failed to comply with his 
mandatory duties under the Act, and did so to spare himself the trouble 
and/ or his brother the many consequences of an additional jail stay and 
domestic violence conviction. Br.Pet. 40-42. The Act's mandatory duties 
cannot be overcome by a reticent victim's wishes or a reluctant officer's 
preferences. Id. at 37-40. 
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II. 
There was probable cause for witness tampering.2 
Jones argues that it is "mere speculation" to infer that he knew an 
investigation into his conduct was underway or pending. Br.Resp. 16. But 
as explained in the State's opening brief, it is not speculation to base rational 
inferences on the available evidence. Br.Pet. 45-46. Further, a belief in an 
investigation is not required-a defendant may act merely to prevent an 
investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1). 
The evidence supported reasonable inferences meeting this element. 
Br.Pet. 45-46. Whether or not Jones believed there was about to be an 
investigation into his response, the fact that he falsely told his brother and 
the jailer that his brother was asleep supports a reasonable inference that he 
knew it was a possibility, and he was trying to head any potential 
investigation off by suggesting that nothing untoward happened the night 
before. Further, whether or not Jones was later honest with investigators 
after the investigation began is irrelevant. See Br.Resp. 20. The crime is 
accomplished by cormnitting an act with intent to prevent an investigation. 
That the atte1npt is unsuccessful and the defendant later comes clean does 
not obviate his culpability- a thief may retun1 stolen goods after being 
2 This section replies to Jones's point I.A. 
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caught, but it does not mean that the goods were never stolen in the first 
place. 
Jones also argues that the State merely speculates on the second 
element of witness tampering: attempting to "induce or otherwise cause 
another person to" either "testify or inform falsely" or II withhold any 
testimony [ or] information." Id. at § 76-8-508(1)(a)-(b). Br.Resp. 18. Jones 
acknowledges, but downplays, the jail deputy's testimony, and "submits" 
that his account of Jones's lie to his brother is "unreliable and incomplete," 
and cannot support probable cause. Id. at 19. 
The testimony was not nearly so shaky as Jones asserts. Though the 
deputy- understandably- did not take precise notes of or record the 
conversation between Jones and his brother as it was happening, nor-
again, understandably- remember their precise words of greeting or order 
of words, the deputy did later make a report. R29:60-64. He used this 
report to refresh his recollection, and from his testimony, it was clear that 
the deputy was close enough to hear the substance of the conversation: 
Jones told his brother that the brother was passed out the entire time Jones 
was at the house and that the brother needed "to do something about his 
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drinking." 3 Id. at 55-56, 62. And any potential misunderstanding about 
what that conversation entailed was cleared up when Jones "sat right next 
to" the deputy and spoke to him directly. Id. at 56. Jones told him what he 
had just overheard Jones telling his brother, and more: that the girlfriend 
had called him to "take care of" his brother the night before; that his brother 
was passed out in bed when Jones got there; and that Jones told her not to 
disturb his brother and to call the sheriff's office if she needed help. Id. at 
57-58. 
Jones acknowledges that the deputy testified that Jones told his 
brother that the brother "was passed out in bed while he was there" -that 
is, the entire tilne he was there. Br.Resp. 8 (citing R29:55). But a few 
sentences later, Jones characterizes it differently, saying that Jones actually 
told his brother that he "was passed out when Uones] left the house." 
Br.Resp. 8 (citing R29:57). That is not what the record states. On direct 
examination, the deputy testified as follows: 
Prosecutor: Okay. Were you able to overhear what Uones and 
his brother] were talking about? 
3 The deputy testified that Jones was seven feet away during his 
conversation with his brother. R29:55. During cross-examination, defense 
counsel stood at what he esti1nated was eight to ten feet away, which the 
deputy agreed was the approximate distance. Id. at 60. The magistrate then 
sua sponte opined that it was "closer to 20 feet." Id. at 61. 
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Deputy: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Will you please just describe for the Court the 
substance of that conversation? 
Deputy: He-they were standing over by H3, I was in the 
middle of the booking counter between the two computers to 
observe them, and I observed Adam tell Travis that he was at 
his residence last night, and that he was passed out in bed while he 
was there. And you know, he told him he was obviously 
intoxicated. They said something-
Court: Who- I thought you just said you heard Adam say this, 
and now you're saying-who said-Adam's saying this? 




Prosecutor: So tell us-Adam told-tell us, what did Adam tell 
his brother, Travis? If you could just-as best a quote as I can. 
Deputy: I'll refer to my report, or my statement. He said that 
when he got to his residence he was passed out on his bed. I then 
heard something regarding a truck, and advice given to Travis, 
his brother, that he needs to do something about his drinking. 
R29:55-56 ( emphasis added). 
The deputy maintained this on cross-examination: 
Defense counsel: Okay. Did he say any- did Adam say 
anything about what he found to you, did he say anything 
about what he found at the residence or the state that Travis 
was in when he got to the residence? 
Deputy: Again, he informed me that his brother was passed out, 




guess it would be his sister-in-law, or his brother's girlfriend or 
~ife- I'm not sure if they were married- that he instructed her 
not to wake him up. 
Defense counsel: Okay. 
Deputy: Because he was intoxicated. 
Defense counsel: So this statement that when he got there Travis 
was passed out asleep in bed, is that essentially what you heard 
him tell Travis? 
Deputy: Yeah. 
Defense counsel: In the holding cell? 
Deputy: By the cell, and then he came up and told me, I don't 
know why, but he did. 
R29:57 (emphasis added). 
Jones alternatively argues that even accepting the deputy's 
recollection was accurate, the conversation did not amount to witness 
tampering because there was no evidence that Jones intended that his 
brother repeat the lie to investigators. Br.Resp. 19. 
But in fact the evidence and reasonable inferences show that Jones's 
lie was intended to impede any investigation into Jones's handing of the 
situation. As explained, Jones had probable cause to believe that his brother 
committed domestic violence assault against his girlfriend. And Jones was 
the police chief of Kan1as, from which it is reasonable to infer that he was 
familiar with the law governing police duties in domestic violence 
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situations, and his potential liability· for not complying with them. Cf Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) ("Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or 
meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime" absent rare exception). 
Indeed, Jones agreed during the interview that he understood that police 
officers have particular duties in domestic violence situations: 
Investigator: Ok. So let me slip the recorder on, we'll record 
this. We got a, we got a request to look into that because when 
you responded, obviously as a police officer, you understand 
that when you respond to calls of domestic violence there are 
certain obligations that we are required to, to kind of check the 
boxes on. 
Jones: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
State's Exh. 1 at 1. In context, this can only refer to the requirements of the 
Act. But at very least, Jones' s knowledge of the Act's requirements is a 
reasonable inference. 
Viewed in the proper light, Jones had a duty to comply with the 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. He did not. But he knew that sheriff's 
deputies responded a short time later and arrested his brother. Br.Pet 6. It 
is reasonable to infer that he then had motive to minimize his knowledge of 
and involvement in the events of that night, given that either his brother or 
his girlfriend would likely tell the deputies that Jones had been to the ho1ne 
only forty-five minutes earlier. 
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It was in this context that Jones went to the jail the next morning and 
told both his brother and the jail deputy that the brother had been sleeping 
while Jones was at the house. By doing so, it is reasonable to infer that 
Jones was trying to influence his hung-over and possibly memory-impaired 
brother's recollection of events - or at very least, communicate to him what 
Jones wished him to say if asked about Jones's involvement. If the brother 
repeated Jones' s lie to investigators, it would affect their investigation by 
minimizing Jones's involvement and providing justification for his inaction. 
And that there would be an investigation was a reasonable inference-
authorities did, in fact, investigate Jones's failure to comply with the Act. 
Jones asserts that "all of the evidence demonstrated that Jones 
believed his conduct that night was proper." Br.Resp. 9. But Jones's 
statement to his brother and the jail deputy belies that-particularly when 
viewed- as it must be- in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, 110. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State's opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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Respectfully submitted on May 8, 2015. 
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